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Design and implementation of a secret
communication system based on TCP
retransmission steganography
Javier Hospital Poncell
Abstract– This paper presents the design, implementation and experimental results of a communi-
cation system based on a network steganography method known as retransmission steganography
(RSTEG). This technique, proposed by Mazurczyk et al. in 2009, is aimed at many network
protocols that use a retransmission mechanism. Essentially, RSTEG works by not acknowledging a
well-received package in order to invoke a retransmission, whose payload data will be exchanged by
a steganogram. A client/server architecture has been built with a simple TCP implementation based
on retransmission time-outs (RTO) that includes the RSTEG functionality. The application is able to
communicate using an HTTP implementation built on top of it. The performed experiments evaluate
the steganographic bandwidth and detectability of the implemented method. An average bandwidth
of 6.4 kB/s was achieved for a 5% of retransmission probability on a 132 kB/s TCP throughput.
Keywords– information hiding, network steganography, RSTEG, TCP
Resum– Aquest article presenta el disseny, implementació i resultats experimentals d’un sistema
de comunicació basat en el mètode d’esteganografia de xarxa conegut com a esteganografia de
les retransmissions (RSTEG). Aquesta tècnica, proposada l’any 2009 per Mazurczyk et al., està
enfocada a protocols de xarxa que utilitzen retransmissions. Concretament, RSTEG consisteix a no
confirmar un paquet rebut per tal de forçar la seva retransmissió. Aquest paquet retransmès haurà
substituı̈t les dades d’usuari per un esteganograma. S’ha construı̈t una arquitectura client/servidor
mitjançant una implementació senzilla de TCP que inclou aquesta funcionalitat. L’aplicació es
comunica mitjançant una implementació d’HTTP construı̈da a sobre. S’han realitzat experiments per
tal d’avaluar la capacitat i la detectabilitat del mètode implementat, amb una banda ampla de 6,4
kB/s de mitjana per un 5% de probabilitat de retransmissió sobre una connexió TCP a 132 kB/s.
Paraules clau– esteganografia de xarxa, ocultació d’informació, RSTEG, TCP
F
1 INTRODUCTION
STEGANOGRAPHY is commonly defined as a set oftechniques that undetectably alter a work (alsoknown as cover) in order to embed a secret mes-
sage. In particular, the term network steganography, first
introduced in 2003 [1], encompasses the methods that
embed secret data in a network communication without
any third-party being aware of it. The concept of covert
channels is a closely related topic, since they usually utilize
• E-mail: javier.hospital@e-campus.uab.cat
• Specialization: Information Technologies
• Work supervised by: David Megı́as Jiménez (DEIC)
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similar techniques in order to establish a communication
channel in a way it was not intended by design. Many
applications have been devised for covert channels, both
legitimate and illegitimate, such as censorship circumven-
tion, whistleblowing, confidential information leakage or
malware communication control.
Thus, these methods have attracted the attention of
security researchers for a long time, since their analysis
provides valuable information for improving network
monitoring and malware detection. The use of static or dy-
namic analysis carried out by Network Intrusion Detection
Systems (NIDS) has become an industry standard and as
a result detection avoidance methods are a growing topic.
For example, in 2013, the Fokirtor Trojan [2] was found
using the SSH protocol as a covert channel for command
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and control while evading detection. In a similar way,
another trojan known as Regin was found using several
methods at once [3], such as embedding control commands
into ICMP packets, HTTP cookies and TCP/UDP Protocol
Data Units (PDUs).
In general, network steganography methods can be clas-
sified in the following taxonomy (Fig. 1):
• Alteration of the Protocol Data Unit (PDU), such
as protocol headers or payload fields. An example
for these is the HICCUPS technique [4], which works
at layer 2 of the OSI stack and consists of deliber-
ately sending MAC frames with bad checksum values.
Those machines that are not part of the system reject
those frames while the others accept them and thus use
them to maintain a covert communication. Another
technique known as YARSTEG is based on the same
idea while using TCP [5].
• Modification of the PDU stream by altering the se-
quence order or introducing intentional losses or time
delays. For example, IP fragmentation steganography
works by splitting and arranging fragmented packets
in such a way that a secret fragment can be hidden be-
tween them [6].
• Hybrid methods that modify PDU data and struc-
ture. Here, we can find methods that are a combina-
tion of the previous categories. An example for these
are RSTEG or the Lost Audio pACKets steganogra-
phy (LACK) method [7], that are applied to the TCP
and VoIP protocols respectively.
Fig. 1: Network steganography taxonomy with examples.
In this paper, we create a secret communication sys-
tem using the hybrid method known as retransmission
steganography (RSTEG) [8]. Specifically, we develop
a simple implementation of the Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) with RSTEG running over it. Then, we
build an HTTP client-server architecture on top of that.
The client and server applications work as a typical REST
web service, while also being able to transfer secret data
with the underlying RSTEG mechanism. The system has
been developed with Python 3.8 and the Scapy library for
packet manipulation and decoding [9].
The rest of this work is organized as follows. Section 2
explains the RSTEG in detail. Section 3 presents the system
architecture design. Next, Section 4 details the implementa-
tion of the system. Then, Section 5 presents the experimen-
tal methodology and results. Finally, Section 6 concludes
this article.
2 THE RSTEG METHOD
In a typical time-out retranmission mechanism, the sender
starts a countdown after sending each packet, which will
then be reset upon receipt of the receiver’s acknowledg-
ment; if the countdown expires, the packet retransmission
is triggered. RSTEG takes advantage of this mechanism
by making the receiver not acknowledge a successfully
received packet in order to expire the sender’s time-out and,
consequently, trigger a retransmission. Then, the sender,
knowingly modifies the packet payload data and embeds
the secret that will be sent as a retransmission. In order for
this to be successful, both the sender and receiver must be
aware of this exchange, thus being able to reliable transmit
the secret without disrupting the cover data.
For example, as shown in Fig. 2, an expected RSTEG
exchange using TCP would be as follows: the client
establishes a connection with the server in order to transmit
a file, which will act as a cover. Then, the client proceeds
to send the file, split into several segments. At some point
during the data transfer, the client will signal a segment
such that the server knows that an RSTEG exchange
should follow. Upon its reception, the server does not
issue the expected acknowledge segment and waits for the
retransmitted segment with the secret payload. Finally,
the server receives and acknowledges the secret and the
connection proceeds as usual until the connection closure.
Fig. 2: RSTEG idea applied to a TCP stream.
However, the RSTEG idea presents several challenges to
address, such as how would the sender signal the receiver,
or what would happen if the segment with the signal or se-
cret payload is lost. Moreover, this method introduces arti-
ficial retransmissions that impact the connection throughput
and they are also a detection key factor. We address these
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issues in more detail in the following sections.
2.1 Signaling
There are several methods for RSTEG to signal an ex-
change. A straightforward way would be to choose a PDU
header field and modify its value as needed. Since we only
need one bit to distinguish between a normal packet or a
signaling one, there are several fields we could use. For
instance, when using the IPv4 protocol, we could modify
fields such as the Don’t Fragment or the Type of Service
fields, or we could also use the header padding bits as a
signal flag. However, this way would be relatively easy to
identify by comparing headers from the same stream and a
procedure to modify the headers must also be implemented
for the sender.
In order to avoid this, another procedure would be to
embed the signal flag into the payload data. The original
RSTEG paper proposes the identifying sequence for mark-
ing a TCP segment as described in Expression (1). The IS
is computed using a cryptographic hash function using the
following parameters: SK is a shared secret key between
the sender and the receiver, followed by the TCP sequence
number, the segment checksum and finally, the signal flag
bit.
IS = H(SK + Seq.No.+ TCPChecksum+ SignalingBit (1)
Once computed, the sender inserts the IS into the pay-
load data in a predefined position. The receiver will check
that position in every payload and compare the received data
versus the computed sequence.
2.2 Packet loss
Since RSTEG modifies the retransmission mechanism,
some edge cases must be addressed regarding packet loss
and the subsequent retransmissions:
• Loss of the signal packet: the sender packet marked
with the signal flag is lost due to the network context
but, given the RSTEG behavior, it is unable to discern
this loss from the expected lack of acknowledgment.
Thus, in this scenario, the receiver will read an unex-
pected packet containing the steganogram. To avoid
the disruption of the connection, the receiver should
not issue an acknowledgment until he receives the lost
signal packet. As a result, the sender will not receive
the expected confirmation and realize that there is a
packet loss situation, at which point the sender will re-
transmit the signal packet until it receives its acknowl-
edgment.
• Loss of the steganogram: this scenario is very simi-
lar to the previous one, since the sender is not able
to recognize which packet was lost (the signal or the
steganogram). First, the sender will try to retrans-
mit the signal packet in case it was lost, but, in this
situation, the receiver should not issue an acknowl-
edgment. Therefore, the sender should retransmit the
steganogram until its reception is acknowledged.
2.3 Detection
Since retransmissions are intrinsic to the network pro-
tocols where we apply RSTEG, the addition of artificial
retransmissions should not be a major detection vector if
they are kept below a reasonable threshold. If possible, the
sender should analyze the target network for the average
retransmission rate to select the appropriate retransmission
probability (RP ) that blends the connection with the
network background traffic. Note that the selected RP
value will also influence the data throughput for both secret
and cover streams.
In addition to retransmissions, the modified packet
checksum could be another detection vector for RSTEG.
During the insertion procedure, the payload data is
swapped by the steganogram but the header is left un-
modified. Thus, a checksum validation would not match
the one from the original packet. Despite this, there
are ways around this issue. For instance, in TCP, the
checksum can be made to match a desired value with
the addition of a compensation code in the steganogram
data. A more detailed overview on this follows in Section 3.
The major weakness of RSTEG against detection are pas-
sive wardens that implement any mechanism of payload
comparison between retransmitted segments. Although
simple and effective, this detection method struggles with
performance on high-traffic networks where all streams
must be monitored. Since a representation of the last ob-
served payload has to be kept in memory for future com-
parison, the memory requirements can be high for a typical
network device.
3 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
A client/server architecture has been designed and imple-
mented in order to illustrate the potential of RSTEG applied
to TCP in a fairly common configuration. As illustrated in
Fig. 3, the system is composed of the following modules:
• RstegTCP: includes all the transport layer logic. It
is in charge of accessing the network layer and con-
tains the essential TCP logic with the added RSTEG
behavior and data buffers. It offers a set of primitives
so other modules can establish and manage a TCP con-
nection.
• RstegSocket: a wrapper that encapsulates the prim-
itives from RstegTCP and offers a socket-like inter-
face similar to other libraries found in many program-
ming languages. Besides calls such as Open, Bind or
Receive, this module offers an rSend call that man-
ages the cover and secret data, together with the re-
transmission probability provided by the user.
• Custom HTTP client/server: a simple HTTP im-
plementation built over the RstegSocket module. The
server offers a REST API with root and ’/upload’ end-
points that reply to GET and POST requests. The
latter endpoint is capable of storing the data received
from requests in disk. In particular, the server not only
stores normal POST data, but also the secret data re-
ceived from the RSTEG method, if any.
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• GUI: a user interface that manages the client applica-
tion. With this, the user is able to select the configu-
ration parameters, such as IP addresses, ports, URLs,
and so on. Also, the user is able to select a connection
for RSTEG and input the desired retransmission prob-
ability. In addition, the module outputs the log registry
to the user and can show the HTML responses using
the local browser.




This module is built around a Python class of the same
name which uses an L3RawSocket object from the Scapy
library in order to send and receive datagrams from the
network layer. The library is also used to build the packet
data structures, such as IP or TCP headers. The TCP
implementation follows the RFC 793 specification but
is far from being as extensive and efficient as current
implementations. That would be beyond the scope of this
work and, consequently, functionalities such as the sliding
window, cumulative ACKs, and congestion avoidance
mechanisms are not implemented. In order to use the
L3 layer, RstegTCP uses its method start to initialize
all class parameters and spawn a thread that polls the
L3 socket for datagrams including a TCP segment with
configured destination. This thread will keep polling the
network layer until the internal state is switched to “closed”.
Upon reception of a valid datagram, the thread calls the
handle packet method with the packet as a parameter.
This method selects the appropriate handler function for
the packet, according to the class internal state and the TCP
flag of the received segment. This is carried out following
the connection state specifications from the RFC 793. Next,
the handler function parses the received segment, update
the internal parameters, and send the suitable response
segment. In order to initiate or terminate connections, as
well as to manage the data transfer, the methods connect,
close and send data are implemented.
To implement the RSTEG functionalities, several addi-
tions have been made. Firstly, we compute and append the
IS to the payload while it is being assembled in order to
invoke the artificial retransmission. The sequence is di-
gested with a SHA-256 hash function, thus resulting in a
32-byte hash. The payload extraction procedure is aware
of this and knowing the sequence length and position it
can successfully extract and evaluate it. Note that the user
data length must be reduced in order to fit the sequence
and comply with the maximum segment size. Secondly,
while assembling the artificial retransmitted segment, if the
steganogram length is less than the original payload length,
padding must be added to maintain the same segment size.
Thirdly, to manage the steganogram data, a second data
buffer is created, parallel to the TCP data buffer. This makes
it easier to manage and receive the secret data across several
retransmitted segments.
Algorithm 1 Find compensation code
1: Parameters: Old payload (oP ) and new payload (nP )
2: function FINDCOMPENSATION(oP, nP )
3: if len(oP )%2 == 1 then
4: oP+ = b“0”
5: end if
6: if len(nP )%2 == 1 then
7: nP+ = b“0”
8: end if
9: o sum = sum(oP )
10: n sum = sum(nP )
11: comp = o sum− n sum
12: comp = (comp >> 16) + (comp & 0xffff)
13: comp += comp >> 16
14: Return comp
Finally, when the artificial retransmission is triggered and
the steganogram is assembled, the checksum must be re-
computed to match the original value. Essentially, the TCP
checksum is the 16-bit one’s complement of the one’s com-
plement sum of all 16-bit words in the header and payload.
Thus, a 16-bit compensation word can be computed and ap-
pended to the new payload so as to obtain the exact same
checksum value from the original payload (Algorithm 1).
4.2 RstegSocket
The RstegSocket class encapsulates an RstegTCP object
and builds a set of methods that make its use easier for
building application protocols. These methods are inspired
by the socket interfaces in the standard library of Python
and other high-level languages. The RstegSocket provides
the following methods:
• Bind (host, port): configures the RstegSocket
class to use the supplied host and port values.
• Listen: starts the underlying module using the binded
values.
• Accept: the RstegTCP thread waits until a three-
way handshake is performed and the connection is es-
tablished.
• Connect (host, port): starts the module and initi-
ates a three-way handshake with the indicated host on
the supplied port.
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• Send (data): slices the data according to the Max-
imum Segment Size (MSS) and sends it to the
send data method in RstegTCP.
• rSend (cover, secret): first, it slices the cover and
secret data. Then, the artificial retransmission trigger
is evaluated using the retransmission probability in the
socket configuration. When the trigger is activated,
the cover slice is marked for retransmission and, af-
ter timeout, the secret slice is sent to the send secret
method.
• Recv: polls the RstegTCP data and secret buffer
searching for new received data. Returns a two-
position array for new cover and secret data.
• Close: closes the TCP connection and stops the mod-
ule, resetting its state and buffers.
4.3 Custom HTTP client/server
This module implements a simple HTTP 1.1 client/server
using the RstegSocket methods. This version has been
selected because it is still prevalent in the Internet and the
Scapy library offers the data structures for the requests and
response headers. The server follows a REST architecture
as many web services do nowadays, while the client sim-
ply offers a straightforward method to make requests and
return their responses. Two HTML resources are exposed
by the / and /upload endpoints, giving clients the option
of storing data (with or without the RSTEG mechanism)
through POST requests. The HTTP server only provides
partial functionality when using browsers as clients due to
the lack of more advanced features of the TCP protocol that
are not implemented in the underlying module.
4.4 GUI
A graphical user interface has been added to facilitate the
use of the client application. The interface is implemented
with the PySimpleGUI wrapper [10], using the Qt library
for cross-platform user interfaces.
The interface frame is divided into 3 sections (Fig. 4).
Firstly, a form gives the users the possibility to choose
which layer do they want to communicate with (raw TCP
or HTTP). Depending on their choice, the second section is
rendered below with the suitable form and input parameters,
such as IP addresses, ports, URL, HTTP method, etc. For
instance, while using the TCP or HTTP POST form, a sub-
form that lets the user pick a cover and secret data from the
disk appears. Other parameters such as the retransmission
probability or a checkbox for setting up the RSTEG mech-
anism are also present. Lastly, the third section is rendered
as a text screen where the connection status and application
log are shown. In addition, two buttons are rendered below
the third section. The “Submit” button verifies the form pa-
rameters are correct and starts the user connection. Finally,
the “Clear Log” resets the text screen from the third sec-
tion. Also, the interface can output the received raw HTTP
responses in a pop-up window or it will try to open the sys-
tems default browser if an HTML response is detected.
Fig. 4: GUI after an RSTEG connection using TCP.
5 EXPERIMENTATION
Three tests have been devised in order to evaluate the imple-
mented RSTEG mechanism. They consist on the following
aspects: measuring the steganographic capacity, testing its
detectability, and also a theoretical comparison with another




The steganographic capacity can be defined as the maxi-
mum number of bits a method can embed on a determined
cover for secret communication purposes. In particular,
we evaluate the RSTEG capacity with the steganographic
bandwidth (SB) parameter. The SB shows the transferred
amount of steganographic data on a determined RSTEG
connection. This parameter is expressed in bits per second
and can be calculated using the following Expression (2),
where Ns is the number of retransmitted segments with an
steganogram, Ss is the payload data size, and T is the con-
nection time length in seconds. Other relevant parameters
are the retransmission probability (RP ) and the TCP cover





Two experimental scenarios with different network
topologies have been constructed in order to evaluate SB
in different implementations (Fig. 5). On the one hand, the
scenario A is an Ethernet LAN with low latency and low
background traffic, whereas the scenario B is an Internet
connection with a geographically remote host and high la-
tency. On both scenarios, a file will be transmitted between
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the client and the server, acting as the cover data. The se-
cret data will be sent with the RSTEG mechanism as long as
the cover is still being transmitted. For both scenarios, the
average SB for ten connections is computed for RP values
between 0 and 10%.
Fig. 5: Experimental network topologies.
Scenario File size MTU RTT Hardware
A 1,2 MB 1500 B 0,50 ms R. Pi 3+
B 220 KB 1500 B 150 ms EC2 t2.micro
TABLE 1: EXPERIMENTAL PARAMETERS
5.1.2 Results
As expected, both scenarios show how the SB grows as
we increase the RP value. With a higher retransmission
probability, more segments with a secret payload are sent,
but this also increases the detection probability. Thus, the
RP value is a key parameter to maintain a balance between
capacity and detectability. At the same time, we observe
how the cover connection throughput degrades as a result
of the increased artificial retransmissions and secret trans-
fer. The maximum TCPT achieved without the RSTEG
mechanism was of 132 kB/s on average. This is a modest
result considering that the implemented TCP version is not
as efficient and extensive as a modern implementation, with
many advanced features missing. For instance, the addition
of sliding window and window scaling mechanisms would
vastly improve the SB and TCPT numbers.
In the first scenario (Fig. 6), an SB of about 6.4 kB/s for
an RP of 5% was measured. This result is six and twelve
times faster than other similar RSTEG implementations for
the same retransmission percentage [11, 12]. Meanwhile,
on the second scenario (Fig. 7), the high latency connec-
tion plus the remote host localization made the performance
vastly decrease, with an SB of only 500 B/s for the same
RP . The lack of advanced TCP features, coupled with a
round-trip time of 150ms on average, are the reasons for
this decrease in performance.
5.2 Detection with Snort
The previous first scenario was modified in order to deploy
a Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) capable of
testing the detectability of the RSTEG method so as to im-
itate a real scenario of a monitored network. In particular,
we deployed Snort 2.9.17 [13], the latest available version
Fig. 6: Steganographic bandwidth (SB) and TCP through-
put (TCPT ) for scenario A.
Fig. 7: Steganographic bandwidth (SB) and TCP through-
put (TCPT ) for scenario B.
at the time of writing. Snort is one of the most widely
used open-source solutions for NIDS, commonly found
in network devices such as firewalls or hubs. Using the
port mirroring technique, we duplicated the RSTEG server
Ethernet traffic into the Snort machine.
Snort is built as a collection of modules known as
preprocessors and a detection rule database used to perform
static analysis. We used the latest available database for
registered users and the default Snort configuration values.
From the RSTEG point of view, the most interesting
preprocessors are Stream5 and Normalize TCP because
these modules are in charge of analyzing the TCP and UDP
streams for any anomalies.
The same tests from the previous scenario were repeated,
this time with Snort deployed. The logs reported an alert
with the 129-5 code for 83% of the segments that included
an steganogram. In particular, the 129-5 alert is described
as “Bad segment, adjusted size less than 0” and classifies
the stream as “potentially bad traffic” with a level 2 priority
out of 4 (where 1 is the highest priority). According to
the Snort database documentation, alert 129-5 is raised by
the Normalize TCP preprocessor but no further detail or
warning regarding its nature is stated. Upon inspecting
the preprocessor source code, we confirmed that the
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preprocessor option known as IPS performs a payload
comparison between retransmitted segments inside a TCP
stream, thus defeating the steganographic mechanism.
Despite this, further research showed that some Snort im-
plementations in network devices, such as the firewall soft-
ware known as Cisco Firepower Management Center, ig-
nore the 125-5 alert by default [14]. Presumably, this could
have been done because of false positives being triggered
by corrupted segments, an increased performance load for
high-traffic networks, or simply a lack of risk awareness due
to almost non-existent documentation.
5.3 RSTEG vs JPEG steganography
Nowadays, most modern steganographic methods based
on digital imagery work by embedding the secret data
inside the most complex regions of the image. For JPEG
images, the steganogram is embedded inside the quantized
DCT coefficients derived from the compression algorithm.
However, the quality factor (QF ) used during the compres-
sion algorithm is a key component in order to establish the
steganographic capacity and detectability rate.
Despite this, we can compute the capacity of a given
image according to the number of alternating non-zero
DCT coefficients (nzAC) and the amount of bits embedded
into them (bpnzAC). The exact number of available nzAC
depends on the image content and the QF used during
the compression phase. According to the study [15],
the average nzac on a 5000 image dataset of 512 × 512
pixels with QF = 80% is 67408 ≈ 67500. Also, ac-
cording to [16], the suitable bpnzAC amount to guarantee
indetectability on a QF = 75% image must be 0.1 or lower.
Assuming these values, the nzac per pixel ratio
(RnzAC/p) for an image compressed with a QF of 80%
would be about 0.25 nzAC/pixel, as shown in Expression
(3). Thus, if we have an image with a megapixel resolution,
we compress it with the aforementioned QF , and embed
0,1 bpnzac, the image capacity (Cn) is about 25000 bits
(3125 bytes), as detailed in Expression (4). In addition, if
we assume a 25:1 compression rate [17], the cover image




≈ 0.25 [nzAC/pixel] (3)
Cn = 0.1×RnzAC/p × (1000000) ≈ 25000 [bits] (4)
In order for the previously estimated JPEG capacity to
match the implemented RSTEG capacity for a 5% RP ,
the cover image should be transmitted at a rate of 244800
B/s (Table 2). Considering that the TCP throughput of the
RSTEG implementation is about 132 kB/s, this means that
if we were to transmit the same steganogram, the RSTEG
method is 1.85 times faster than the JPEG method. Note
that these results are computed using the implemented TCP
version in order to compare both methods under the same
conditions. Thus, if we were to use an optimal TCP imple-
mentation we would observe a greater throughput value but
the 1.85 times difference would persist.








TABLE 2: MEASURED CAPACITY FOR RSTEG
(CRSTEG) AND THE REQUIRED BANDWIDTH FOR
JPEG TO MATCH THE SAME CAPACITY AS RSTEG
USING A 80% OF QF , 0,1 BPNZAC AND A 25:1
COMPRESSION RATE.
6 CONCLUSION
In this work we have designed and created a communication
system based on the retransmission steganography method
(RSTEG). This method is oriented to network protocols
that provide a retransmission mechanism and it works
by not acknowledging a successfully received segment in
order to trigger an artificial retransmission, whose payload
has been replaced by an steganogram. In particular, the
TCP protocol has been chosen for this system and thus we
have implemented a simple version with the added RSTEG
mechanism using Python and the Scapy library. On top of
that, a client/server architecture has been built using the
modified RstegTCP, wrapped inside a socket-like interface.
In the application layer, a simple HTTP 1.1 implementation
has been developed using the underlying RSTEG socket,
which it has been used as a REST service on the server
application. In addition, the client application has been
enhanced with a graphical user interface such that the user
can test several network parameters and use the REST
service while performing RSTEG exchanges.
The experimental results show a steganographic band-
width of 6.4 kB/s and 8.5 kB/s for a 5% and 7% of
retransmission probability respectively, which is widely
superior than in other published implementations of
RSTEG. The implemented TCP connection measured
a throughput of only 132 kB/s. This is due to many
modern functionalities and optimizations of a typical TCP
implementation which were out of the scope for this work,
such as the sliding window, the window scaling options,
cumulative ACKs and congestion avoidance mechanisms.
As future work, it would be interesting to consider a much
more in-depth implementation of RSTEG with these other
features of TCP.
In addition, we tested the detectability of the implemen-
tation against a Network Intrusion and Detection System
(NIDS). For this, we deployed the latest version of Snort,
a widely used open-source NIDS solution. Our tests
show that a preprocessor known as the TCP normalization
engine is able to raise an alert for the majority of artificial
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retransmitted segments, as it performs a payload compar-
ison between the newer segment and the original one. In
particular, the preprocessor flags the segments as bad traffic
and raises the alert 129-5, which is barely documented in
the Snort alert database. It should be noted that we found
some network devices implementing Snort that have this
specific alert ignored by default.
Finally, we performed a theoretical comparison of
RSTEG against another steganographic method based on
JPEG images, while using parameters that guarantee a good
level of indetectability. We calculated the theoretical ca-
pacity of the JPEG method and its bandwidth equivalent
to match the implemented method. The results pointed
out that, for the same steganogram data and connection
throughput, RSTEG is 1.85 times faster than its counter-
part.
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APPENDIX
A.1 Experimental results summary












TABLE 3: RESULTS FOR SCENARIO A.












TABLE 4: RESULTS FOR SCENARIO B.
A.2 User interface
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A.3 UML class diagram
